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Moore: Letter from Port Moresby

LET TER FROM PORT MORESBY
John D. Moore

As the world shifts away from the global
war on terrorism toward renewed greatpower rivalry, areas previously considered
strategically peripheral offer the United
States and its allies both opportunity and
challenge. Papua New Guinea (PNG),
with its strategic location in the southwest
Pacific, is poised to play a role in this new
“Great Game.” American engagement with
PNG and other Pacific Island nations that
focuses on collaboration with regional allies and that smartly applies U.S. political,
financial, and military power will be a key
Source: “Papua New Guinea,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention,
factor in the outcome. At the same time,
17 August 2021, wwwnc.cdc.gov/.
understanding the broader regional set of
interests of allies and opponents alike will better inform policy making and improve the potential for positive policy outcomes.
A COMPLEX PLACE
Although it achieved its independence in 1975, PNG still is beset by multiple
development challenges, akin to those experienced elsewhere in the Pacific and
parts of Africa. Yet, as seen in the national introCurrently based in Australia, John D. Moore has
spection displayed at the February 2021 passing
over twenty-five years of experience supporting U.S.
of PNG founding father and first prime minister
government, humanitarian, and private-sector operSir Michael Thomas Somare, the country conations in fragile-state and frontier-market contexts
across the Middle East, South Asia, and East Africa, tinues to show the potential to move beyond its
including five-plus years in Papua New Guinea.
current challenges.1 To those fortunate enough
to have lived and worked in PNG, it is at once a
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breathtakingly beautiful and a frustratingly complex place to engage. With over
850 languages, thousands of clan and subclan groups, an overlay of Christianity
on local belief systems, and over 70 percent of its population living in rural—
often highly rugged—areas, the complicated nature of the country cannot be
overstated.2 PNG occupies the eastern half of the western Pacific island of New
Guinea, together with the key islands of New Britain, New Ireland, and the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, along with some six hundred lesser islands
and atolls.3 PNG, with an estimated population of eight million, is the largest and
most populated of the countries composing the Pacific Island area. In addition
to its human complexities, PNG has an incredible diversity of geographic and
natural resources.
Sharing a long land border with Indonesian Papua, PNG is a young, modern
nation-state, but one that reflects and holds onto a much longer history.4 The trials of traditional society coming to grips with modernity have shaped PNG for
decades and also will influence the way it engages, and is engaged by, the evolving rivalry between the United States and its allies and a strengthening China
and those countries within its orbit. There is limited government penetration
across the country, and many of the present development challenges are likely
to continue for the foreseeable future. Limited institutional capacity, lack of a
governmental monopoly on violence, a limited formal economy, and the need
for a political leadership that can articulate, garner support for, and implement
public policies that represent a shared sense of national interest are but some of
the issues that PNG faces. It is essential to understand these challenges, as they
shape directly the way in which the growing competition to establish favorable
regional relations is unfolding.
A STRATEGIC POSITION
PNG’s previous colonial power, Australia, which managed it after World War I,
has a deep and enduring relationship with its northern neighbor. PNG remains
Australia’s largest recipient of foreign aid, and strong ties continue between the
Australian Defence Force and the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF). PNG dominates the northern approaches to Australia; that, added to historical tension
with Indonesia and increasing Chinese involvement in PNG and the region,
explains why Australia’s interest in maintaining a leading role in PNG is likely
to continue.
While Australia plays an outsize role in PNG, multiple other countries also
have substantial ties to the country. Japan long has been an aid donor to PNG
and maintains strong diplomatic ties, and New Zealand similarly is a leading
donor. Ties between PNG and other Melanesian countries, such as Fiji, continue
to strengthen and grow. At the same time, Chinese diplomatic and economic
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss4/10
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Source: Shugart, “A Chinese-Built Airport?”

investment in PNG has increased, including involvement in a mix of infrastructure projects (including energy, roads, and airports) on mainland PNG, as well
as the islands of Manus and Bougainville. Similarly to the pattern seen in other
countries, PNG’s leaders seek to benefit from multiple points of investment in the
country without compromising its sovereignty.
While memory of the combat that engulfed the then territory of New Guinea
remains a key part of Australian and PNG military lore, most Americans long
have forgotten their country’s involvement in the campaign, much less New
Guinea’s strategic role in supporting the American advance through the Pacific.5 Some seven thousand American soldiers and airmen were killed during the
New Guinea campaign, with missing-in-action records indicating that hundreds
more were lost in the jungles and seas across mainland PNG and its surrounding
islands.6
Since the 2018 U.S. commitment to join Australia’s effort to upgrade the
PNGDF’s Lombrum Naval Base on Manus Island, many elites in Port Moresby
view the country as having reemerged onto the U.S. radar. Others may recall
Manus Island as playing a part in the much-debated Australian asylum-seeker
policy. One of PNG’s twenty-two provinces, the island sits north of the PNG
mainland and is positioned along critical air and naval lines of communication
linked to U.S. outposts in the Marianas and elsewhere in the Pacific.7 Its position enables naval and air assets based on the island to influence the area along
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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Australia’s eastern seaboard south to New Zealand, as well as the approaches to
maritime East Asia.8
Manus, as well as other locations in PNG, complements efforts by the United
States, Australia, Japan, and their allies to expand and enhance maritimesurveillance networks to monitor vessel traffic and conduct early warning, while
assisting the PNGDF to increase its basic maritime-reconnaissance and patrol
capabilities. While the country is unable to house major USN surface combatants
without significant and sustained investment, pre-positioning of fuel and other
stocks in PNG can assist vessels operating in the region. Meanwhile, advances
in aerial, surface, and subsurface unmanned capabilities hold the potential for
the establishment of a network of interlocking microbases across the Pacific, in
which Manus could play an important role. In addition to Manus Island, locations elsewhere along PNG’s northern and eastern areas may offer the potential
for both fuel pre-positioning and the basing of intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance assets in the future. Engagement also can span other areas of mutual interest, including research into tropical diseases, countering illegal fishing,
monitoring changes in coastal as well as blue-water environmental conditions,
and maritime emergency response.
RELATIONSHIPS ARE WHAT MATTER
While PNG offers opportunities to support U.S. and coalition naval operations,
stronger diplomatic and military relations with PNG and other Pacific island nations are likely to prove even more critical than the physical basing of supplies or
naval assets. Lessons from the Cold War, as well as post–Cold War engagement
in the Middle East and South Asia, repeatedly have demonstrated that relying
on merely transactional approaches rather than longer-term relation-building
efforts—whether conducted in bilateral or multilateral settings—limits the
potential for lasting positive outcomes. Other lessons underscore the dangers
of mission creep and overreach, along with the problematic impacts that occur
when tactics are mistaken for strategy.
The U.S.-Australia relationship is a cornerstone of American policy in this
part of the Pacific, but Australia has limitations in its ability to manage regional
engagement across the strategic-operational-tactical continuum. Given Australia’s historical connections to PNG, along with PNG’s proximity as Australia’s
nearest neighbor, successive governments in Canberra have pushed to be the
lead partner for PNG and the medium through which Washington should engage
with Port Moresby. Over the decades, Australia regularly has advised the United
States and other allies to “leave PNG to us.”9
However, the rising competition with China has seen the Australian position
moderate in recent years, as Canberra aims to collaborate with Washington and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss4/10
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others to counter Beijing’s growing political and economic investment in PNG.
The need for the United States to bolster, and on occasion strategically to realign, allied engagement in the region is reflected in recent divisions within the
Pacific Islands Forum and subsequent concerns that China may take advantage
of such rifts, should Australia prove unable to resolve them effectively.10 In turn,
while Australia welcomes further U.S. engagement in the region, Canberra has
valid concerns over any U.S. engagement that might smack of the clumsiness
Washington has shown in other regions. Genuine partnership and a willingness
by Canberra and Washington both to lead and to follow, depending on shifting
situational dynamics, are needed.
Capitalizing on joint efforts in the development space as a platform for
increased military cooperation is not just smart but essential. The Australian
Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific (AIFFP) is one such framework,
with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States working with the PNG
government to support the country’s target of providing 70 percent of the population access to reliable electricity by 2030 under the AIFFP’s Papua New Guinea
Electrification Partnership.11
Chinese involvement in Bougainville is an ongoing concern for Australia and
the United States, as are Chinese efforts to establish a fish-processing facility on
Daru Island, which is located only a few kilometers from Australia’s northern
border and some two hundred kilometers from its mainland.12 Chinese engagement in PNG has seen several Chinese parastatal and Chinese Communist
Party–linked private-sector companies build ties to local politicos and businesses. As part of its regional initiative, China has become an increasingly important source of loans and other financial support to the PNG economy, and
Beijing remains an important export market for PNG’s natural resources.13 A
Chinese-government Guide for Foreign Investment and Cooperation, published
in January 2019, gives insight into Beijing’s intent. The document characterizes PNG as a supporter of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, with the closing
paragraph stating, “The Chinese government calls on more powerful Chinese
companies, inspired by the Belt and Road Initiative, to carry out reciprocal trade
and invest in PNG.”14
While the discussion of so-called debt trap diplomacy has ebbed and flowed,
of likely greater importance than a specific debt percentage of gross domestic
product owed to Beijing is the way Chinese loans (or other state-to-state engagements) are structured and governed. By allowing local elites access to these
rent streams, China builds local leverage. Such leverage may not prove lasting,
however; there are few obvious sociocultural ties between the PNG and Chinese
peoples, and thus the extent to which Beijing can use transactional relationships
to exert more-overt control over PNG’s external orientation remains to be seen.
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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The Manus example is informative. At the same time as the joint AustralianU.S. effort at Lombrum is under way, Manus Island Momote Airport, financed
primarily by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), is being upgraded by China
Harbour Engineering Company, a subsidiary of China Communications Construction Company (CCCC).15 Worthy of note is that CCCC reportedly is supporting the construction of China’s artificial island bases in the South China Sea,
so Washington has targeted it for potential sanctions.16 According to politically
astute Manus Islanders, the current governor is “pushing above his weight” and
does not necessarily have broad support, even as he attempts to use Chinese economic involvement to advance his own narrow interests.17
While local political leaders may seek to use the rivalry with China to their
personal advantage, there remains a reservoir of positive sentiment toward the
United States. The historical memory of the American role in Manus and elsewhere in the vicinity during World War II is key to this, with the generation of
elders who lived during that period passing on stories to successive generations.
Yet geostrategic interests need both to respect and to value local pragmatism
about the people’s socioeconomic aspirations.
ENGAGEMENT FORWARD
In looking toward fostering a new era of U.S.-PNG relations, it is critical that the
United States keep its eyes wide open regarding the country’s reality. Local politics increasingly has become a means for elites to capture wealth, with the views
and actions of elected leaders not necessarily representing the actual interests of
the communities with which the United States may engage. Australia’s engagements in PNG and Oceania offer insights into how the United States best can
build and sustain long-term political-military relationships in support of American interests. USN port visits and humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief
operations, along with public-relations efforts, will continue to prove important.
Participation alongside the Royal Australian Navy in training exercises with PNG
counterparts, combined with U.S. provision or funding of equipment and logistical support for PNGDF littoral operations, also provides opportunities for naval
forces to engage with PNG and to shape U.S.-PNG relations positively.
Beyond these traditional forms of engagement, an increased tempo of visits from
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command personnel, combined with efforts by the U.S. State
Department and other government agencies to strengthen diplomatic and economic relations, at the same time as the United States builds further collaboration
with Australia and other allies in the region, is critical. The eventual opening of the
new U.S. embassy building in Port Moresby will be an important milestone in the
growing American commitment to PNG, with embassy reach strengthened by the
integration of a defense attaché office within the diplomatic mission.18 Additional
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol74/iss4/10
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interagency involvement that draws on the principles espoused in the Global Fragility Strategy would bolster efforts to strengthen U.S.-PNG relations further.19
While collaboration with Canberra and other regional capitals is essential,
it also is important for Washington to foster a distinctly U.S. relationship with
the PNG state and its diverse people. In PNG there is a rare spirit of openness
and friendship toward the United States that often is absent in other parts of the
world. Yet that sense of goodwill is insufficient absent U.S. political and economic, as well as military, investment. With China able to use strategic investments
to peel away layers of elite support, engagement in PNG and elsewhere is not
cost-free, yet the transactional nature of China’s engagement to date offers the
United States the opportunity to strengthen ties with both PNG’s government
and its society.
China’s rise does not necessarily imply that future conflict is destined. However, where a vacuum of U.S. and allied engagement and investment exists, Beijing
will be poised to fill such space. As the strategic landscape continues to evolve,
ensuring a permissive peacetime environment for maritime operations while
strengthening political and military relationships well prior to any potential
war-fighting scenario is fundamental. The United States must work with other
nations, not alone nor solely with existing regional allies. America must act with
humility and listen to those with more insight regarding regional, country, and
subcountry dynamics.
From the perspective of those in the region, Washington should pursue a multidimensional approach that understands and appreciates differences between
“like-situated countries” that are more concerned about risks arising from greatpower rivalries and those countries that are like-minded and willing to oppose
the weakening of a liberal, rules-based order. Countries across the region have
different interests and drivers and have different, and occasionally competing,
foreign-policy priorities, as well as different capacities to counter Chinese pressure.20 Efforts to move beyond the transactional aspects of state-to-state relations
to relations based increasingly on shared values ultimately will prove more lasting
and more supportive of American interests.

NOTES

1. Somare was a prominent PNG political
leader. Often called the father of the nation,
he was a teacher and radio journalist before
his 1968 election to the territorial House of
Assembly. Appointed chief minister of the
territory in 1973, he became the country’s
first prime minister upon independence in
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1975, and served again as prime minister
on two other occasions. His formal political
career ended in 2012.
2. The main religion in PNG is Christianity,
although, like elsewhere, pre-Christian belief
systems continue to shape the interpretation
and practice of religion. For a more detailed
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overview of Christian denominations and
religious minorities present, see U.S. State
Dept., “Papua New Guinea,” in 2019 Report
on International Religious Freedom (Washington, DC: Office of International Religious
Freedom, 2019), available at www.state.gov/.
3. The other half of the island is part of Indonesia, with West Papuan independence and
associated claims of Indonesian human-rights
abuses an ongoing issue. PNG is divided
into four regions, with a total of twenty-two
provinces across the different regions, as
follows: Highlands Region—Hela, Jiwaka,
Chimbu, Eastern Highlands, Enga, Southern
Highlands, and Western Highlands; Islands
Region—East New Britain, Manus, New
Ireland, Autonomous Region of Bougainville,
and West New Britain; Momase Region—East
Sepik, Madang, Morobe, and West Sepik
(Sandaun); Southern Region—Central, Gulf,
Milne Bay, Oro, Western, and the National
Capital District.
4. PNG’s settled history is thousands of years
old, with European (British, Dutch, German)
engagement increasing in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.
5. It was over the PNG island of Bougainville
that U.S. airmen intercepted and shot down
a Japanese bomber carrying the architect of
Japan’s Pearl Harbor attack, Adm. Isoroku
Yamamoto, in Operation VENGEANCE. For
details of U.S. soldiers and airmen repatriated
from PNG, search the Defense POW/MIA
Accounting Agency (DPAA) records available
at www.dpaa.mil/.
6. “Pentagon Enlisting Outsiders to Help Search
for US WWII MIAs,” Chicago Tribune, 19
September 2015, www.chicagotribune.com/.

10. Tess Newton Cain, “With Five Countries Set
to Quit, Is It Curtains for the Pacific Islands
Forum?,” The Conversation, 15 February
2021, theconversation.com/.
11. Current connectivity is 13 percent. For additional detail on the AIFFP, see AIFFP, “Papua
New Guinea Electrification Partnership,”
media release, 30 June 2020, www.aiffp.gov
.au/.
12. For a more detailed look at Chinese involvement in Bougainville, see Rowan Callick,
“Real Cost of Independence: The Referendum
in Bougainville Brings Risks and Opportunities for Australia and China,” The Australian,
8 December 2019, www.theaustralian.com
.au/. Bougainville often is seen as a potential
bellwether; should it achieve independence,
other provinces in PNG also may seek to secede. Like Bougainville, East New Britain and
New Ireland have a closer cultural affinity
to the Solomons than to Papua New Guinea,
while Enga in the western highlands always
has had a physical and political remoteness
from Port Moresby.
13. In 2018, data from Australia’s Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade showed China as
the third-largest recipient of PNG exports,
behind Australia and Singapore, with Japan
in fourth place. See Australian Government,
Dept. of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Papua
New Guinea—Papua New Guinea’s Global
Merchandise Trade Relationships,” fact sheet,
dfat.gov.au/.
14. Graeme Smith, China’s Guide to Investment
Cooperation in Papua New Guinea, In Brief
2019/25 (Canberra, ACT: Australian National
Univ., n.d.), available at dpa.bellschool.anu
.edu.au/.

7. See Thomas Shugart, “A Chinese-Built Airport Next Door to a Key Australia-US Naval
Base?,” The Interpreter, 7 August 2020, www
.lowyinstitute.org/. Manus Island is the largest
island in what is known as the Admiralty
Islands.

15. The ADB’s two largest funders since its inception are Japan and the United States. The
People’s Republic of China is the third-largest
contributor to the ADB, with Australia the
fourth.

8. See Ben Wan Beng Ho, “The Strategic Significance of Manus Island for the U.S. Navy,”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 144/12/1,390
(December 2018), available at www.usni.org/.

17. Bill Bainbridge and Jack Kilbride, “Lombrum
Naval Base: Manus Governor Slams Australia
over Plans to Develop Joint Naval Base,” ABC
News [Australia], 20 November 2018, www
.abc.net.au/.

9. Jonathan Pryke, “The Curious Case of Aid
Concentration in Papua New Guinea,” The
Interpreter, 14 February 2019, www.lowy
institute.org/.

16. Shugart, “A Chinese-Built Airport?”

18. The new U.S. embassy will serve Papua New
Guinea, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands.
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19. For details on the Global Fragility Strategy,
see U.S. State Dept., 2020 United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability
(Washington, DC: 2020), available at www
.state.gov/.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021

MOORE

139

20. Kuyoun Chung, “Why South Korea Is Balking
at the Quad,” East Asia Forum, 31 March
2021, www.eastasiaforum.org/.
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